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BRAZILIAN REAL CRISIS REVISITED: A LINEAR 






This article aims at identifying the indicators of the Brazilian real 
crisis through building a probit model incorporating 20 monthly 
macroeconomic, political, and financial sector indicators from 1980:1 
– 1999:1. Results indicate that the significant variables are inflation 
(1-month lag), real exchange rate (1-month lag), import growth (1-
month lag), US interest rates (2-month lag), public debt/GDP (2-
month lag), and current account/GDP (3-month lag). Evidence 
further indicates that the signs of the variables are in line with our 
expectations, with the exception of US interest rates. 
 
JEL Classification: C51, O54 




      The Brazilian real’s fall in January 1999 was the result of an ill-
conceived currency and inflation policy. Brazil had long had severe 
difficulties with inflation. In 1994 Brazil began implementing the 
Real Plan, which was an economic stabilization plan that involved 
temporary indexation. The indexation was tied, through the exchange 
rate, to the number of dollars required to purchase a product rather 
than to measures of inflation and the currency. Hence, despite its 
success in reducing inflation below zero by the end of 1998, the 
controlled devaluation built into Brazil’s crawling peg failed to offset 
the effects of earlier differences between US and Brazilian inflation 
rates under the Real Plan.  During this period, Brazil’s currency had 
been widely considered to be overvalued by 15 to 25 percent (Gruben 
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and Welch, 2001). In January 1999, Minas Gerais Governor Itamar 
Franco’s announced that he would suspend his state’s debt payment 
to Brazil’s national government. This declaration was followed by 
similar statements from six other governors, who demanded to 
suspend their own debt. Due to this political turmoil,  billions of 
dollars in capital flowed out of the country, and the Brazilian equities 
fell in value. Within a week, the head of Brazil’s central bank 
resigned and the central bank announced changes in the nation’s 
exchange rate band to allow a 9% devaluation. Only two days after 
Brazil’s new devalued exchange rate band was announced,  the 
Brazilian Central Bank announced that the real would no longer be 
pegged to the US dollar and would be allowed to float. However, 
immediately after the devaluation, the government tightened its 
monetary  policy and managed to stabilized the currency within a 
period of less than six months.   
   This article aims at identifying the indicators of the Brazilian 
real crisis through building a linear probability model incorporating 
20 monthly macroeconomic, political, and financial sector indicators 
from 1980:1 – 1999:1. This article is structured as follows. The next 
section provides an overview of the literature. Section III introduces 
the data and the methodology. Section IV presents the findings and 
Section V points out the conclusions that emerge from the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
      Literature on financial crises is categorized into three mainstream 
models, namely first-generation models, second-generation models, 
and third-generation models. In the " first-generation" models 
(Krugman 1979; Flood and Garber 1984), a government with 
persistent money-financed budget deficits is assumed to use a limited 
stock of reserves to peg its exchange rate and the attempts of 
investors to anticipate the inevitable collapse generates a speculative 
attack on the currency when reserves fall to some critical level.  
  
     In "second-generation" models (Obstfeld 1994, 1996, Ozkan and 
Sutherland 1995, Radelet and Sachs 1998) policy is less mechanical: 
a government chooses whether or not to defend a pegged exchange 
rate by making a tradeoff between short-run macroeconomic International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-1(2004) 
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flexibility and longer-term credibility. The crisis then arises from the 
fact that defending parity is more expensive as it requires higher 
interest rates. Should the market believe that defense will ultimately 
fail, a speculative attack on a currency develops either as a result of a 
predicted future deterioration in macro fundamentals, or purely 
through self-fulfilling prediction. 
 
     The need for third generation models became apparent in 1990s 
with Mexican Tequila crisis of 1994 and the East Asian crisis of 
1997. A number of new approaches have emerged to explain how 
these crises evolved and how they spread from country to country. 
Third-generation models (Dooley 1997, Krugman 1998, Radelet and 
Sachs 1998) are categorized into three different groups such as herd-
behavior, contagion, and moral hazard.    There have been numerous 
studies in the literature on EWS of financial crises. Although studies 
differ i n terms of the econometric method followed, variables 
employed, definition of financial crisis, and the time span on which 
the EWS is built, the literature can conveniently be categorized into 
two main groups. The first group consists of studies based on a  
model known as Signals Approach, which involves observing the 
behavior of a number of indicators as they issue signals when they 
exceed certain threshold values. The second approach is based on a 
logit or probit model and uses lagged values of early warning 
indicators and a crisis dummy variable designed to predict crises.  
 
   Signals approach was developed by Kaminsky  et al. (1998) and 
consists of a bilateral model where a set of high frequency economic 
variables during a specified period is compared, one at a time, with a 
crisis index  so that  when one of these variables deviates from its 
normal level beyond a specific threshold value prior to a crisis, it 
issues binary signals  for a possible currency crisis.  The model 
devised by Kaminsky  et al. (1998) consists of 15 variables with 
optimal thresholds estimated for each country in relation to 
percentiles of the distribution of observations of the indicator 
maximizing the correct signals and minimizing the false ones. They 
set their signal horizon at 24 months and defined a currency crisis as 
a sharp depreciation of the currency or a large decline in international Feridun,  M.                    Brazilian Real Crisis Revisited: A Linear Probability Model 
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reserves that exceeds the mean by more than three standard 
deviations. The percentage of correct signals to the percentage of 
false signals, on the other hand, gives an indication of the accuracy of 
each indicator. They used monthly data of 15 developing and 5 
industrial countries from 1970 to 1995 and detected an average of 61 
crises during this period.  Their best indicators, based on noise-to-
signal ratio, are real exchange rate, banking crises dummy, exports, 
stock prices, and M2/international reserves.  This model was later 
improved by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who used the same 
sample as in Kaminsky et al. (1998). Their model identified a total of 
26 banking and 76 currency crises, 18 of which were twin crises.  
 
    They found that the occurrence of both types of crises has 
increased sharply since the early 1980s with only one twin crisis 
taking place before 1980. In their study  Kaminsky and R einhart 
(1999) also found out that banking and currency crises had common 
causes  with the former usually preceding the latter and following a 
particular pattern where the peaks of banking crises follows the 
currency crises. Probit and logit models,  pioneered by Frankel and 
Rose (1996), use limited dependent variable models known as probit 
or logit regressions to identify the causes of crises and to predict 
future crises.  
 
     This approach defines a crisis indicator equal to one or zero 
depending on whether a currency crisis does or does not occur within 
the specified time period. Frankel and Rose (1996) attempted to find 
out how international debt structure and external factors affected the 
probability of currency crises.  They used a number of external, 
internal and foreign macroeconomic variables in a multivariate probit 
model specified for  105 developing countries, covering annual data 
from 1971 to 1992. They defined a crisis as at least 25% depreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate that also exceeds the previous year's 
depreciation level by at least 10% and constructed a dummy crisis 
variable according to that rule.  Results of their model indicate that 
the  significant variables are output growth, foreign direct 
investment/total debt, reserves, domestic credit growth, external debt 
and foreign interest rates. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) also 
used a probit model to analyze currency crises, particularly the International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-1(2004) 
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Mexican Tequila Crisis of 1995, using a sample of 20 emerging 
countries that were vulnerable to  contagion effect.  They used the 
weighted sum of the percent decrease in reserves and the percent 
depreciation of the exchange rate as their crisis index. They found 
that  crises happened only in the countries with weak fundamentals 
such as low reserves,  fragile banking systems and overvalued 
exchange rate. They also found evidence showing that short-term 
capital inflows do not matter when reserves and fundamentals are 
strong  whilst government consumption and current account deficits 
matter only in the countries with weak fundamentals and weak 
reserves.  Berg and Pattillo (1999) tested models offered by 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), Frankel and Rose (1996) 
and Sachs, Tornell, Velasco (1996) to see if these models could 
predict the Asian Crisis using information available at the end of 
1996. They found out that the models offered by Sachs, Tornell, 
Velasco (1996) and Frankel and Rose (1996) were ineffective in 
forecasting the Asian Crisis. The Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 
(1998) model, on the other hand, proved to be successful.  
 
     Crisis probabilities generated by this model for the period 
between May 1995 and December 1996 were statistically significant 
predictors of actual crisis occurrence over the following 24 months. 
Berg and Pattillo (1999) also found out that in all three approaches, 
the probability of a currency crisis increases when domestic credit 
growth is high, the real exchange rate is overvalued relative to trend, 
and the ratio of M2 to reserves is high. In a recent study, Komulainen 
and Lukkarila (2003) examined the causes of financial crises in 31 
emerging market countries during 1980-2001 using a probit model 
based on 23 variables. Their findings show that financial crises occur 
together with banking crises and an increase in private sector 
liabilities, public debt, foreign liabilities of banks, unemployment, 
inflation, and US interest rates raises the probability of a crisis. Table 
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3. Data and Methodology  
 
     The linear probability model used in this study is built based on 
monthly, end-of-month observations from 1980:1  – 1999:1. Most 
data are gathered from DataStream. The data for government debt 
figures come from several sources, including IFS, the World Bank’s 
WDI and IMF country reports. The tested 20 indicators are selected 
on the basis of currency crisis theories and previous empirical 
literature, and are transformed into log returns to achieve mean 
reverting properties and to make statistical testing procedures valid. 
In addition to the traditional macroeconomic variables, we include 
several indicators describing the vulnerability of domestic banks.  
 
     These indicators include the growth of bank deposits, the ratio of 
the lending rate to the deposit rate, and the ratio of bank reserves to 
assets. We also employ variables that indicate vulnerability to a 
sudden stop of capital inflows. These variables are public debt, broad 
money to reserves, and private sector liabilities. We also include an 
index
1 that proxies the political instability. To study foreign 
influences on crises, we include the US interest rate. Since we study 
all these variables simultaneously, we hope to distinguish those 
indicators that reflect actual causes of the Brazilian real crisis of 
1999. Table 2 shows the explanatory variables, their expected signs 
and explanations. Linear probability models traditionally define a 
currency crisis as a discrete event. One common technique is to 
construct an index of exchange market pressure as a weighted 
average of exchange rate changes and reserves changes (as well as 
interest rates in some cases). The crisis is said to occur when the 
index exceeds a particular threshold level. At this point, we calculate 
an exchange market pressure index (EMP). The index includes 
exchange rate depreciation and loss of reserves, which are weighted 
                                                 
1 This index consists of a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 or 
zero depending on whether an event adversely effecting political stability 
does or does not occur during a particular month. If an event such as the 
assassination or resignation of a prominent political figure, or unrest in the 
country, takes place, the dependent variable takes the value of 1. Otherwise 
it remains 0. Feridun,  M.                    Brazilian Real Crisis Revisited: A Linear Probability Model 
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to influence equally. Our exchange market pressure index takes the 
form: 
EMP = ?e – (s e/s r)*?r   (1) 
 
where  ?e denotes the change in exchange rate and ?r in 
international reserves,  se and sr denote the standard deviation of 
exchange rate alteration and reserves, respectively. We determine the 
values of the EMP index more than three standard deviations above 
the mean as a crisis. Since macroeconomic variables often worsen 
prior to the actual crisis, we define a crisis not only the crisis month 
but also the four months before. In other words, we use a four-month 
window for our variables.  
 





Inflation  + 
Inflation is associated with high nominal 
interest rates and may proxy macroeconomic 
mismanagement that adversely affects the 
economy and the banking system 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997). 
Real Exchange 
Rate  - 
Currency overvaluation may lead to 
deteriorations in the current account and 
have historically been associated with 
currency crises (Berg et al. 1999). 
Export Growth  - 
Weak exports may lead to deteriorations in 
the current account and have often been 
associated with currency crises (Dowling 
and Zhuang, 2000). 
Import Growth  + 
Excessive import growth could lead to 
worsening in the current account and have 
been related with currency crises (Berg and 
Patillo 1999) 
M1  + 
Growth of M1 indicates excess liquidity, 
which may invoke speculative attacks on the 
currency thus leading to a currency crisis 
(Eichengreen et al. 1995).  International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-1(2004) 
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Domestic 
Credit/GDP  + 
High levels of domestic credit indicate the 
fragility of a banking system  (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1998). 
Stock Prices  - 
Recessions and a burst in asset price bubbles 
often precede currency crises (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999). 
Public Debt/GDP  + 
Higher indebtedness is expected to raise 
vulnerability to a reversal in capital inflows, 
and hence to raise the probability of a crisis 
(Lanoie and Lemarbre, 1996). 
Foreign direct 
investment/GDP  + 
Shows net inflows in the reporting economy. 
East Asian countries had been dependent on 
net capital inflows over the decade 
preceding the crisis 
US Interest rates  + 
International interest rate increases are often 






Shows the liquidity of the banking system. 
Adverse macroeconomic shocks are less 
likely to lead to crises in countries where the 
banking system is liquid (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1997). 
Lending Rate-
Deposit Rate  + 
An increase of this indicator reflects a 
deterioration in credit risk as banks are 
unwilling to lend or decline in loan equity 
(Kaminsky et al. 1998) 
Real interest rate  + 
Used as a proxy of financial liberalization. 
Liberalization process itself tends to lead to 
high real rates. High real interest rates have 
been increased to repel a speculative attack 




Most currency collapses are preceded by a 
period of increased efforts to defend the 
exchange rate, which are market by 
declining foreign exchange reserves 
(Kaminsky et al. 1998). Feridun,  M.                    Brazilian Real Crisis Revisited: A Linear Probability Model 
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Current 
Account/GDP  - 
An increase in the current account is 
associated with large capital inflows which 
indicate a diminished probability to devalue 
and thus to lower the probability of a crisis 





Indicates to what extent the liabilities of the 
banking system are backed by foreign 
reserves. It also captures the ability of the 
central bank to meet sudden domestic 





Higher fiscal deficits are expected to raise 
the probability of crisis since they increase 
the vulnerability to shocks and investor’s 
confidence (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1997). 
Political 
Instability  + 
Frequent change in the political regime may 
reduce the willingness of the international 
financial community to provide financing 
for a current account deficit. Moreover, 
political instability may lead to larger budget 
and current account deficits. 
GDP per capita  - 
Deterioration of the domestic economic 
activity is expected to increase the 
likelihood of crises  (Lanoie and Lemarbre 
1996). 
National Saving 
Growth  - 
High national savings may be expected to 
lower the probability of debt rescheduling 
(Lanoie and Lemarbre 1996). 
 
Given the aforementioned indicators and the crisis index, the linear 
probability model estimates the probability for financial crises. A 
linear probability model is built where the dependent variable y is a 
dichotomous variable assuming the value of 1 when a crisis takes 
place and 0 if otherwise.  
0 if the peg is in effect    ? =  { 
1 otherwise 
 (2) International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-1(2004) 
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The dependent variable is then regressed on the explanatory variables 
based on the form: 
     
In this study, one-, two-, and three-month lagged values are initially 
used in the same regression to identify significant and insignificant 
variables, and in case of significant variables, to distinguish the most 
significant lags, i.e. the lags with the highest Z-statistic or lowest p-
value. These variables are then used in the final regression after 
removing the insignificant ones. This is done using a backward 
stepwise regression, which starts with including all variables and 
their three lags, in our model. Next, the insignificant variables are 
dropped until only significant ones remain. Then, the most significant 
lag for each variable is identified and used in the final regression. 
Table 3 shows the expected signs of the coefficients of the variables. 
For individual variables, a positive coefficient means that an increase 
in this explanatory variable increase in dependent variable, that is, 
dummy dependent variable gets close to 1 signaling a crisis. A 
negative coefficient, on the other hand, would mean that an increase 
in this variable would cause a decrease in the dummy dependent 
variable indicating a tranquil time.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
      Table 4 summarizes the results of the first pass regression. The 
most significant lags  of each variable are then used in a second 
regression, and then, in a third regression. The results of these 
consecutive regressions are given in table 5 and 6, respectively. 
Results of the final regression are reported in table 7. Strong evidence 
emerges that the significant variables are inflation (1-month lag), real 
exchange rate (1-month lag), import growth (1-month lag), US 
interest rates (2-month lag), public debt/GDP (2-month lag), and 
current account/GDP (3-month lag). The signs of these variables are 
in line with our expectations, with the exception of US interest rates 
which has a negative coefficient. 
 
 
                                       ? i = a i + ß i x i + e i                                                                              (3) Feridun,  M.                    Brazilian Real Crisis Revisited: A Linear Probability Model 
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Table 4. First pass regression 
  1-month lag   2-month lag   3-month lag  
Variable  Coef,  Z-stat  Coef.  Z-stat  Coef.  Z-stat 
Inflation  10.57  2.85***  3.52  0.72  3.02  -1.91* 
RER  -7.02  1.75*  -2.34  0.62  -2.00  1.16 
Export G.  8.12  0.67  2.70  0.32  2.32  0.32 
Import G.  11.62  2.38**  3.87  0.65  3.32  0.35 
M1  -16.89  0.59  -5.63  0.86  -4.82  0.44 
Domestic 
credit / GDP 
-11.89  -2.21**  -3.96  1.08  -3.39  0.56 
Stock prices  -6.82  -0.85  -2.27  0.76  -1.95  0.65 
Political 
Instability 




11.62  -0.18  2.34  0.62  3.25  0.88 
BR /BA  16.89  1.29  2.70  1.32  2.40  0.75 
US interest 
rates 
-11.89  1.42  -3.87  2.26**  -2.34  0.72 
FDI / GDP  -6.82  0.76  -5.63  0.09  -2.44  0.62 
National 
savings 
6.34  0.76  3.96  1.35  2.32  0.32 
RIR  11.38  0.88  2.27  0.76  3.32  1.75* 
PD / GDP  0.89  0.75  2.11  2.76***  4.82  0.67 
Current 
account/GDP 
-11.89  1.45  -3.79  0.24  -2.40  2.38** 
GDP p.c.  6.82739  0.76  0.29  0.26  -2.34  2.59*** 
FB / GDP  6.34  2.30**  2.11  0.09  2.44  1.22 
M2 / FER  -11.38  1.42  -8.79  1.77*  -3.25  0.85 
FER  0.89  0.75  0.29  1.36  0.25  1.41 
* Significant at the 10% level.** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant 
at the 1% level. BR/BA=Bank Reserves/Bank  Assets.FB= Fiscal Balance. 
FER= Foreign Exchange Rate. G. = Growth. PD=Public Debt. RER= Real 
Exchange Rate. RIR=Real Interest Rate. 
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Table 5. Second pass regression    Table 6. Third pass regression 
Variable  Coefficient  Z-
statistic 
  Variable  Coefficient  Z-
statistic 








-11.83  0.31 
Import 
growth (-1) 
11.6  2.38**    Import 
growth (-1) 
7.93  1.72* 
Domestic 
credit / GDP 
(-1) 
-11.89  -2.21**   
Domestic 
credit / GDP 
(-1) 
-9.12  0.25 
US interest 
rates (-2) 
-3.87  2.26**    US interest 
rates (-2) 
-6.88  2.22** 
Real interest 
rate (-3) 
3.32  1.75*    Real interest 
rate (-3) 
6.56  0.72 
Public debt / 
GDP (-2)  2.11  2.76***    Public debt / 








-5.82  2.71*** 
GDP per 
capita (-3) 
-2.34  2.59***    GDP per 
capita (-3) 








11.92  0.65 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 7. Fourth pass regression 
Variable  Coefficient  Z-statistic 
Inflation (-1)  23.5459  2.3323** 
Import growth (-1)  47.2458  2.3765** 
US interest rates (-2)  -11.8154  1.6427* 
Public debt / GDP (-2)  11.6349  2.3657** 
Current account/GDP (-3)  -8.6578  2.2975** 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level 




     This study analyzed the causes of the Mexican peso crisis using 
data from 1970:1  – 1995:1. It estimated a probit model using 20 
macroeconomic, political, and financial sector indicators. Results 
indicate that the significant variables are inflation (1-month lag), real 
exchange rate (1-month lag), import growth (1-month lag), US 
interest rates (2-month lag), public debt/GDP (2-month lag), and 
current account/GDP (3-month lag). Evidence further indicates that 
the signs of the variables are in line with our expectations, with the 
exception of US interest rates which has a negative coefficient. These 
results are not surprising. It was particularly expected that Brazil’s 
chronic inflation would play a role in the real crisis of 1999. High 
levels of import growth, public debt, and current account deficits 
have widely been accepted to be associated with financial crises as 
explained in section II. Therefore, in light of this study, we may 
conclude that the Brazilian real crisis of 1999 was c aused by the 
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